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Abstract 
 
This paper critically evaluates ‘one size fits all’ characterisations of African states in the 
context of diverse change in Africa. It provides an original critique of Frederick Cooper’s 
gatekeeper states concept based on a novel application of the theory of uneven and combined 
development. The theory draws attention to the unevenness of development across the 
international system, the production of multiple, combined forms of state and points to an 
expectation of heterogeneity among ‘later developing’ countries, questioning generalised 
characterisations of ‘African’ states as a sui generis category of state. The paper argues that 
Frederick Cooper’s concept of the ‘gatekeeper state’ sits close to, though not entirely within, 
this pattern. This careful application of theory shows that while there are strong synergies 
between Cooper’s empirical account of state formation and developmental processes 
highlighted by the theory, there is greater divergence over the question of heterogeneity. The 
paper argues that uneven and combined development helps to reveal the limits of ‘one-size 
fits all’ approaches and the potential for a broader theoretical grounding to Cooper’s 
gatekeeper concept. In doing so it provides an important corrective to donor assumptions of 
general failings of African states and uniform policy prescriptions with which to address 
them. 
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Introduction1 
 
This article presents an original critique of ‘one size fits all’ characterisations of African 
states in the context of rapid and diverse change in Africa. This is a significant issue because 
policy makers and international institutions often assume that ‘all African states exemplify 
the same political system and the same political history…prone to political decay, 
incompetence and disintegration’.1 This article tackles this question through a novel 
application of the theory of uneven and combined development to Cooper’s notion of 
‘gatekeeper states’. Uneven and combined development (U&CD) is an approach to 
International Relations (IR) that emphasises the critical causal importance of ‘the 
international’ to processes of development and state formation. The theory draws attention to 
the unevenness of development across the international system, the production of multiple 
hybrid, or combined, forms of state, and to attempts to promote ‘catch-up development’ 
through, for example importing or emulating development in other societies. Importantly it 
suggests that we should expect heterogeneity rather than homogeneity among ‘catch-up’ or 
‘later developing’ countries.  
 
There is no shortage of analyses seeking to divine the character of, and diagnose the faults of, 
African states. From post-colonial critiques of neo-colonialism in the 1960s and 70s, to 
Jackson and Rosberg’s identification of ‘personal rule’2, through to Bates’ rent-seeking3, 
analyses went on to questions of ‘negative sovereignty’4, ‘extraversion’5, ‘bifurcated states’6 
and neo-patrimonialism, whether ‘working’7 or in ‘decay’8. Despite significant differences, 
all these endeavours share two linked commitments: first, that the colonial era and its ending 
continues to shape the nature of the state in Africa; and second, that there is enough 
commonality to speak of generalisations about ‘African’ states almost as a sui generis 
category of state. The idea that all states in Africa share common characteristics has found 
ample reflection in policy, particularly among donors and international institutions. Here, 
general characterisations of African states are coupled to two further notions: that African 
states are deficient in some way that is particularly damaging to development prospects; and 
that a common set of liberal reforms to the political and legal make-up of the state and 
economic policy, are required for aid to ‘work’ and for development to prosper.9  
 
Frederick Cooper’s concept of the gatekeeper state sits close to if not entirely within this 
pattern.10 His presentation of gatekeeper states is rooted in a rich historical narrative which 
emphasises the contingency of outcomes, dependent on ‘the struggles that happened along 
the way’11 and which draws strong continuities between the colonial era and the present. 
Cooper’s emphasis on African agency and choice in shaping historical outcomes stands in 
sharp contrast to some of the more dismissive accounts of African politics and represents a 
distinctive take on African statehood. However, Cooper’s account also shares a focus on the 
constraints within which such agency operates and how this plays out in relation to elite use 
of state revenue, institutional development, and the way that power is sought, secured and 
exercised. In addition, despite his emphasis on the fluidity and open-endedness of the 
processes surrounding independence, Cooper’s account also emphasises strong 
commonalities among African states. 
                                                 
1 I am indebted to Sara Dorman, BISA 2015 gatekeeper state workshop delegates, and Justin Rosenberg, for 
helpful comments and editing on an earlier draft, as well as from three peer reviewers. 
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Three key arguments are presented in this article. First, though unconnected literatures, there 
are some interestingly strong commonalities between Cooper’s empirical account of state 
formation in Africa and key developmental processes and outcomes highlighted by U&CD. 
Second, U&CD not only offers a potential international and social theoretical grounding for 
key elements of Cooper’s account, it also helps to identify and provide an explanation of the 
international unevenness that frames African development. Third, however, U&CD points 
towards an expectation of heterogeneity among different national developmental trajectories, 
an outcome at odds with the gatekeeper state characterisation. This is particularly marked in 
the contemporary period where, even while gatekeeping behaviours continue, there are 
divergences between those states able to pursue some developmental objectives and those 
less able to do so. The picture we develop, of dynamic, varied change across Africa, makes a 
‘one-size fits all’ diagnosis increasingly problematic for analysts and policy makers alike.  
 
 
Gatekeeper states and uneven and combined development 
 
This section provides a very brief introduction to both the gatekeeper state concept and 
U&CD, while the following section explores synergies between Cooper’s account of 
gatekeeping and key processes highlighted by U&CD.  
 
The gatekeeper state 
Cooper’s notion of the gatekeeper state is in many ways a beguiling idea. Though not 
formally theorised, it nevertheless informs much of the rich historical account presented in 
Africa Since 1940, providing the context within which Cooper traces the on-going 
developmental challenges in African countries. Interestingly, though it formed no explicit 
part of Cooper’s following work12 Cooper returned to the notion in his more recent Africa in 
the World, tracing the continuing negative effects of ‘gatekeeping’ in contemporary African 
states. Like many other accounts of African statehood, the roots of post-independence state 
structures lie in the colonial period when, in the absence of other options by which to sustain 
colonial rule, the gatekeeping state took form. As independence was won, African elites 
adopted rather than revolutionised the gatekeeping institutions, resulting in states hampered 
by their own limited inheritance:  
‘They had trouble collecting taxes except on imports and exports; they had trouble 
setting economic priorities and policies, except for the distribution of resources like 
oil revenues and customs receipts; they had trouble making the nation state into a 
symbol that inspired loyalty. What they could do was sit astride the interface between 
a territory and the rest of the world, collecting and distributing resources that derived 
from the gate itself; customs revenue and foreign aid; permits to do business in the 
territory; entry and exit visas; and permission to move currency in and out.’13 
Cooper’s conception of African states centres on control of the ‘gate’ as a focus of state 
revenue-raising and rent-seeking by state elites. However, the importance of gatekeeping for 
Cooper, also broadens out to other features of statehood and politics in Africa. The interface 
between the internal and external is not only the main source of state revenue but also the 
focus of states’ capabilities and bureaucracy, limiting states’ ability to project power or 
establish hegemony effectively. This in turn leads to the creation of vertical clientilistic ties 
lubricated by gatekeeper rents in order to bolster domestic support bases and reliance on 
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external recognition and support to consolidate rule. Limited economic development, and the 
focus of political power and opportunities for accumulation of wealth on a central point, also 
gave rise to damaging patterns of winner-takes all politics where those excluded from state 
power had few alternatives than to challenge for control of the state.14 Fear of such 
opposition often led to authoritarian forms of politics and the use of rents accruing from 
control of the gate to secure political power, creating a reinforcing dynamic of weak 
economic and social development. In Cooper’s work, the gatekeeper idea therefore describes 
a particular aspect of state development and elite behaviour but one which has much wider 
ramifications. Whether this justifies using ‘gatekeeping’ to characterise the state as a whole, 
is discussed later.  
 
Uneven and combined development 
Uneven and combined development is an emerging approach within International Relations 
whose origins lie in the writings of Leon Trotsky but which has received a contemporary 
exposition and considerable elaboration from Justin Rosenberg and his varied interlocutors15. 
Rosenberg’s exposition of the theory begins with a series of ‘transhistorical’ claims about the 
nature of development and its relationship to the international. In any historical period, it 
claims, social development is uneven and multiple: ‘at any given historical point, the human 
world has comprised a variety of societies, of differing sizes, cultural forms and levels of 
material development’.16 Moreover, these unevenly developed societies co-exist and interact 
with one another in an active way: ‘… it is not just that societies coexist in some passive way, 
but rather that ‘diplomacy’ – in the broadest sense of the negotiated management of inter-
societal relations – has been an institutionalised feature of just about every type (or case) of 
society’.17 Such interaction occurs across a range of social fields, or what Buzan and Little18 
call the different ‘sectors’ of the international system: the political, military, economic and 
socio-cultural19.  
 
Perhaps the key dynamic highlighted by the theory is how any given society responds to and 
adapts to changes external to it, what Trotsky termed ‘the whip of external necessity’, while 
also maintaining internal authority and control. Those external changes might be the 
industrialisation of rival states, the arrival of imperial powers, military threats or potential 
alliances, or new economic competition or opportunities. However, because of the 
unevenness of development across the international system, societies facing such external 
pressures and constraints also draw on technologies, ideas, institutions and finance from 
outside of their own resources, utilising what Trotsky termed ‘the privilege of historic 
backwardness’20, to alter and accelerate their own development process. These external 
threats, opportunities and the ‘national’ responses to them should be seen as central causal 
factors in the developmental path of any individual society, internalising the ‘international’. 
Moreover, because each ‘national’ process of development is therefore intimately connected 
to and an integral part of the wider international system, social development as a whole, seen 
across the international system, is itself a ‘combination’ of all the interactive, multilinear and 
uneven processes of development. 
 
The theory is distinctive in how it poses the relationship between international relations and 
development and as such has considerable potential for both IR and development studies and 
the relationship between the two.21 A key part of this is that it makes ‘the international’ – 
‘that dimension of social reality which arises specifically from the coexistence within it of 
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more than one society’ – internal to how we understand development over time.22 Societal 
multiplicity and unevenness, manifested in the different ‘national’ levels and pathways of 
development, is integrated into theory as a causal factor shaping the path of development 
within particular societies. In this it can claim to be distinct from national (‘internalist’) 
explanations of social development23 and from ‘externalist’ approaches such as dependency 
theory, as well as other approaches in IR/IPE24. Likewise, while much of development 
studies touches on relevant processes such as emulation, incorporation, amalgamation and 
hybridisation, they don’t get much of a theoretical presence. Even in modelling 
developmental states, external political and economic relations are ‘additional factors’ that 
‘need to be added’.25 
 
Rosenberg’s development of the theory makes some very general historical claims but also 
draws attention to a number of key features of developmental processes. In the next section, 
we go through three of these highlighting some interesting synergies between them and 
Cooper’s account of Africa’s gatekeeper states. Doing so allows us to see how U&CD can 
give Cooper’s empirical account a more theoretical grounding in IR, one that situates the 
emergence of gatekeeper states in a wider account of the processes of development and a 
context of global unevenness. However, in the subsequent section we will also see some of 
the limitations of the gatekeeper state concept, at least as it has been developed thus far, in 
handling the divergent developmental trajectories between African states.  
 
 
Combination, active importation and interventionism 
 
This section deals with three propositions about developmental processes highlighted by 
U&CD: all development is a process of combination leading to hybridisation; states will 
actively import components of development to ‘leapfrog’ stages of development; and later 
developing states will tend towards interventionism and authoritarianism. In taking each in 
turn we can show not only how Cooper’s account provides empirical evidence for these 
processes in the African context, but also how U&CD can provide a broader theoretical 
grounding for an understanding of African state formation.  
 
Combined development results in hybridisation 
Uneven and combined development argues that in responding to external changes and 
internal challenges, any given society invariably embodies within its development elements 
from outside that society, whether they be new technologies, forms of politics, organisational 
or institutional forms or new ideas about science, politics or culture. Such incorporation of 
elements from other societies into any particular society’s development may be a voluntary 
act (state elites or business leaders, promoting the adoption of a new, foreign technology), 
done as a product of asymmetric interdependence (such as trade-offs of policy reform in 
exchange for financial resources as seen in aid bargains) or through more forcible means 
(such as imperialism or colonial conquest). Unlike most other theories of development, this is 
posited as a general feature of all social development, including the rise of the West itself.26 
 
Each society in the international system can therefore be viewed as an amalgam or hybrid – a 
combined product – of processes of internal development and external interaction containing 
within it elements deriving from outside any ‘indigenous’ socio-cultural entity.27 We should 
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therefore expect to find in any individual state, fusions of old and new: pre-existing aspects 
of society are combined with the new imports; some sectors leap ahead while existing forms 
of production remain, older relationships between rulers and ruled are combined with newer 
modes of politics. No society can therefore be regarded as original or pure but as an amalgam 
that evolves over time comprising combinations of internal and external drivers of change.  
 
Though a general feature of development anywhere, the focus on its combined character and 
hybridity of state and social forms is particularly useful in understanding modern African 
development. On the one hand it draws our attention to many shared external factors, arising 
from the global unevenness of development, that have historically shaped the continent’s 
development, of which colonialism and the need to interact with the industrialised powers are 
central defining ones (and provides a theoretically-informed explanation of that framing 
condition).28 On the other hand it also allows for an understanding of the different ways this 
has interacted with a range of national conditions producing a variety of individual cases.  
 
In Cooper’s account, combination is most clearly expressed in his general insistence that 
African and European history cannot be seen as distinct entities but as deeply entwined with 
each other. For Cooper, when looking at the interaction of Europe and Africa we are not 
engaging with neatly bounded entities but also seeing how: 
‘the world in which both regions came to be defined was produced, via the uneven, 
power-laden forms of connection. Africa’s economic present is a co-creation, 
emerging out of long-term interactions among non-equivalent political and economic 
structures.’29.  
Such co-productions for Cooper included novel forms of production and property and labour 
relations such as in cocoa farming in West Africa30 or in the migrant labour schemes in 
southern Africa.31 They were also expressed, for Cooper, in the nationalist movements that 
led Africa to independence including the weaving together of African and western ideas in 
pan-Africanism, négritude, the nascent notions of citizenship that emerged in the inter-war 
years,32 and in the variety of religious movements that combined externally-introduced 
Christian beliefs with various re-imaginings of African traditions.33 Indeed, African political 
leaders adapted many of the modernising strategies of the late colonial period in their own 
campaigns for national modernization. 
 
We also have an idea of the state itself as a hybrid product of combined development: 
‘Gatekeeper states are thus not “African” institutions, nor are they “European” impositions; 
they emerged out of a peculiar Euro-African history’.34 Indeed, the very fact that the colonial 
and post-colonial states were so focussed on managing the ‘gate’ owed much to the way in 
which European control of the continent unfolded and what the leaders of independent Africa 
did with that inheritance. In an account that has echoes of Mamdani’s35 description of the 
‘failure’ of the European civilising mission, Cooper claimed that: 
‘The British conception of “indirect rule” and the French idea of “association”, both 
emphasized in the 1920s, were attempts to put a positive light on the colonial failure 
to remake African societies and to confine politics to tribal cages.’36  
That is, having embarked on their respective missions into Africa, the European powers were 
confronted with the need to rule over their extensive and diverse acquisitions. Lacking the 
political and military means to carry forward the civilising mission (other than in a limited 
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sense of interventions to curb continuing practices of slavery) the Europeans fell back on 
arms-length governance of the African interior. The colonial gatekeeper state was the result.  
 
Social and economic change – increasing urbanisation, political organisation and labour 
activism – all helped to undermine the fragile construction that was indirect rule. In the wake 
of strikes and revolts in colonies in Africa and the Caribbean in the 1930s and 40s, and the 
additional pressures created by the Second World War, British and French policy shifted in a 
renewed effort to regain control with the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act 
1940, the French Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development of 1946 and the loi 
cadre in French West Africa in 1956 all intended to put a developmental impetus into 
colonial rule. Within this, various forms of representation and nascent forms of citizenship 
were conceded within the colonial gatekeeper state, albeit while continuing attempts to 
stabilise the rural-urban divide37, an approach that reached its zenith (or nadir) in South 
Africa.38 As Cooper argues, the elites who took power at independence worked with this 
inheritance, relying on receipts from the gate to retain power. But independence brought with 
it new external flows of financial resources in the form of aid as well as military support. 
New combinations unfolded – independence tied those in state power and in the offices of the 
bureaucracy into new networks with the wider society, something that was very different 
from the social and political ties that bound colonial officials and rulers.39 
 
U&CD therefore allows us to see Cooper’s gatekeeper states a particular African example of 
a more general phenomenon – as hybrid products of combined development. They are 
African and European, fusing elements of modern statehood with a range of different forms 
of political community and authority existing, or being brought into being, through 
colonisation.40 The gatekeeper states, both under colonialism and afterwards, were products 
of this history of interaction rather than expressions of essential and unchanging African 
cultures. The contemporary policy corollary of all this is also important: ‘African problems’ 
for Cooper are in fact Euro-Afro-American co-productions with implications for how we 
think of responsibility for addressing them.41 
 
Actively importing components of development to ‘leapfrog’ stages of development  
Although processes of combination can be driven from ‘below’ through diffuse processes of 
international interaction, they are also driven forward by state elites responding to external 
threats and opportunities. In the modern capitalist era, such active importation has become a 
key element of catch-up development whether one is talking about railways in India, iron 
production in Germany, liberal political and economic reforms in Africa in the post-1980 
period or the influence of the so-called ‘Beijing consensus’ more recently.  
 
One of the advantages of being able to import technologies, forms of organisation and ideas 
from more developed societies is that catch-up economies can ‘leapfrog’ stages of 
development and adopt leading-edge technology. For example, while modern industry took a 
long time to develop and emerge in its original British heartlands, modern production 
methods can be imported into today’s industrialising societies ready-formed. This gives 
catch-up economies, in Trotsky’s view, a ‘privilege of historical backwardness’, accelerating 
their developmental trajectory. It is in fact a widely recognised feature of development, 
classically in Gerschenkron’s analysis42 but also in more recent debates on Africa including 
UNECA’s promotion of green technology and President Obama’s claim Africa could ‘skip 
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certain stages of development’.43 U&CD gives this empirical recognition a theoretical 
grounding residing in the general temporal and spatial unevenness of development as a 
whole.44  
 
Following independence, Cooper argues, African elites had two main aims – to ‘build 
something’ and to remain in power. And African elites, including those who utilised rhetoric 
of ‘African tradition’, imported a great deal from outside in pursuit of both. African rulers 
from Nkrumah onwards sought to kick-start industrialisation, supported from the outside by 
external agencies like the World Bank. As Cooper’s account of the 1960-80 period shows, 
this included utilisation of resources, technologies and ideas from outside including dams, 
power plants, factories, aid, military hardware, know-how, and ideas and techniques for 
planning development and running economies.45 Nor were all such efforts unsuccessful: from 
1965-73 industry expanded twice as fast as GDP and though mining dominated, 
manufacturing grew at 7 per cent per year 1960-80.46 The use of external resources also 
enabled many African countries to expand state social expenditure leading to improvements 
in life expectancy, child mortality rates, education and literacy.47    
 
But Cooper also emphasizes that attempts to ‘build something’ were undermined  by the 
other priority – staying in power – and the limitations of state capacity: 
‘They had trouble collecting taxes except on imports and exports; they had trouble 
setting economic priorities and policies, except for the distribution of resources like 
oil revenues and customs receipts; they had trouble making the nation state into a 
symbol that inspired loyalty.’ 48  
By the 1980s, as cross-border flows declined, a new kind of more coercive import took over, 
in the form of structural adjustment and liberalisation.  
 
State interventionism and authoritarianism 
Neoliberals excepted, many analysts argue that some form of state intervention, guiding 
industrialisation, is important: ‘Latecomers … face a number of competitive disadvantages 
which can hardly be overcome without pro-active government action’.49 Whether 
authoritarianism is necessary for late industrialisers is a different matter, though the huge 
social stresses entailed in the process of industrialisation – what Alice Amsden called 
‘thunderous social change’50 – could be seen to militate in this direction, a point borne out by 
many twentieth century examples of industrialisation.  
 
U&CD locates this tendency within its conceptualisation of the tensions arising from catch-
up development. In responding to competitive challenges or opportunities from without, 
states as active agents in driving change, have necessarily been interventionist. However, 
internal unevenness resulting from the combination of new and old forms of production, 
social classes, political organisation and authority often create unstable and politically-
volatile situations. The absence of the middle classes and civil society who might provide 
political grounding for industrialisation creates additional vulnerability to regimes pursuing 
catch-up development. Combinations of modern statehood and capitalist social relations on 
the one hand with non-capitalist social relations and particular local ‘traditions’ on the other 
mean that authoritarian forms of politics often arise as a means of maintaining order. 
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Cooper’s account again gives us an empirical recognition of this in the African context. In 
seeking to ‘build something’ and ‘remain in power’, African states were interventionist and 
authoritarian. The priority of maintaining order shaped much that the colonial state did and 
drove the reliance on indirect rule in the early part of the 20th century. The need to maintain 
order became even more pressing in the wake of the First World War when Africans who had 
served in the war began acting ‘like citizens’, demanding welfare and pensions because of 
their contributions to the war effort.51 What followed was something of a rear-guard action 
by colonial states to limit urbanisation and keep ‘African ambition’ corralled into ‘tribal 
cages’ and, in the context of demands of financial self-sufficiency, to keep the colonial state 
afloat by raising revenue from international transactions.  
 
With independence, this unsatisfactory mix of weak institutional development, limited 
economic transformation and pressures from African activists from below framed and 
constrained the new states. Yet many rulers adopted similar strategies as used by the colonial 
state.52 With the end of colonialism, the gatekeepers had to maintain their hold on power and 
independence added the need to weave patron-client relations within the state.53 Some of this 
had already begun before independence. As Allen argued, the ministries that were transferred 
to African control before independence were often spending ministries, allowing those who 
had gained positions within the state to extend and consolidate their support bases through 
distributing state resources.54 Limited internal political development and the hurried use of 
elections in the final years of colonialism and in the process of granting independence 
accelerated the need to construct vertical ties between officials – the new ‘political class’55 – 
and supporters, bequeathing a reliance on clientilist forms of politics.56  
 
Regime survival also rested on external recognition and the resources that came with it. The 
emphasis then prevalent on state planning was useful for African governments wary of 
independent domestic power-bases such as farmers or labour unions.57 Having targeted the 
unfair pricing practices of marketing boards during the campaigns for independence, they 
then kept them in place in order to try to generate resources from agriculture to fuel 
industrialisation.58 And yet, having trouble projecting power inwards59 they instead sought to 
use those interventions – ‘collecting and distributing resources that derived from the gate 
itself’ – to sustain political support.60 
 
In the African context therefore, a particular form of interventionism – gatekeeping – was 
entwined with a series of broader authoritarian state practices. However, the particular 
combinations of authoritarianism and interventionism had different impacts in different 
contexts. Though in many places the reliance on clientilistic ties and repression led to 
damaging forms of politics, there were also developmental achievements, as Cooper notes. It 
is to this question of the heterogeneity of developmental outcomes that we now turn.  
 
 
Heterogeneity and contemporary African development 
 
For Rosenberg (and for Trotsky) combination and the political tendencies of later 
development don’t result in homogenisation of the different states and societies within the 
international system as a whole. In any given society, importing technologies or ideas from 
outside removes them from their original socio-cultural context and brings them into contact 
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with a different socio-cultural setting. They are thereby combined with the new context and 
result in something new be it forms of state, ways to organise and regulate the economy, 
norms or cultural creations. In a famous phrase, criticising Marx’s claim that ‘The country 
that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own 
future’61, Trotsky responded, ‘England in her day revealed the future of France, considerably 
less of Germany, but not in the least of Russia and not of India’.62  
 
‘Catch-up’ development therefore exhibits a constantly unfolding process of creating new 
developmental paths which in turn then change the context for those other societies that 
coexist with them. Seen from the perspective of the international system as a whole, U&CD 
thus presents us with an expectation of seeing multilinear, divergent developmental 
experiences and heterogeneous forms of state.  
 
Cooper and heterogeneity 
As we have seen, Cooper’s account of African development and politics highlights well key 
processes contained within U&CD. The theory’s prediction of heterogeneity, however, sits 
less comfortably with Cooper’s gatekeeper state concept. This is not because Cooper rejects 
the idea of heterogeneity empirically, quite the opposite. Rather, it is that the under-
specification of the concept of gatekeeper states makes it difficult to identify different 
trajectories among African states.  
 
As noted earlier, characterising Cooper’s account as a ‘one size fits all’ approach would be an 
overstatement. Not only does Cooper state that Africa is characterised by ‘vast differences’63 
but illustrates this in the rich historical detail in his work. Cooper was also aware of the 
variety of outcomes that combined development could lead to – import ‘European’ political 
ideas into a new setting and they will produce a different outcome than in Europe: 
‘It may be that the ballot box is a “European” institution, but that does not mean that 
the way it is used in Ghana has the same meaning and consequences as the way it is 
used in Switzerland’.64 
Even within Africa, Cooper notes, the introduction of elections under colonialism had 
markedly different impacts. In places such as such as Gabon and French Congo, where 
elections were held with little pre-existing political mobilisation, politics took on a more 
ethnicised logic than in places such as Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, where there were already 
political parties and ‘horizontal’ institutions like trade unions.65  
 
Nevertheless, Cooper’s awareness of variation within Africa is never cashed in conceptually. 
In surveying the contemporary period, Cooper doesn’t identify clear examples of states that 
have escaped ‘gatekeeper’ status.66 Perhaps Cooper notes, South Africa is one example, 
where citizens can accrue wealth without controlling the gate and where organisations 
promoting social progress, independent from the state, exist.67 Yet even here other 
commentators see the rise of gatekeeping rather than its transcendence.68 For all his 
commendable emphasis on contingency and agency, therefore, the gatekeeper 
characterisation remains a defining feature of African states in general.69 
 
Yet the scale of contemporary change in Africa asks us to asses how far this is the case: has 
external change lessened or consolidated gatekeeping practices? Is gatekeeping still trapping 
all African states in the negative dynamic Cooper identified? And what signs are there of 
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strategies alongside or instead of gatekeeping that are impacting on development prospects? 
These aren’t questions that are easily answerable within the gatekeeper concept itself. 
However, we can begin to address them utilising analytical steps internal to U&CD: a 
changed external environment confronting African development; the national responses to 
those changes; and the new, heterogeneous processes of combined development that are 
resulting.  
 
A changed external environment 
The past decade and a half have seen dramatic changes in Africa, perhaps nowhere more so 
than in the continent’s growth rates. In contrast to the adjustment years, the 21st century saw 
an overall resurgence of growth in sub-Saharan Africa, averaging around 5 per cent in 2000-
2010 with some countries experiencing high growth over virtually the entire period. As many 
have pointed out, this average masks a number of differences between different national 
economies with variations along a number of different variables. Typically, this resurgence of 
growth in Africa is associated with one of two major external changes: improvements in 
governance driven forward by aid donors, or the impact of the rise of China and other 
developing countries and the boost they have given to the demand for and price of 
commodities. Where the former is seen to lead to a decline in gatekeeping as opportunities 
for rent-seeking are curtailed by governance reforms, the latter is seen to reinforce 
gatekeeping. Both of these are overly simplistic.  
 
The first claim, that African growth is associated with (or caused by) liberal governance 
reforms, draws on a number of indicators including improvements in governance, 
transparency, the ease of doing business, low inflation and lower budget deficits.70 Such 
reforms, it is argued, have addressed the key faults of gatekeeper states and created the kind 
of business climate needed to attract investment and stimulate growth.71 However, this 
account overstates the extent of liberal reform. Just as scholars (in Coopers’ words, ‘who like 
their colonialism very colonial’72) often over-estimated the power of colonial authorities to 
shape outcomes in Africa, so too, analyses of aid relationships overstate the power of donors 
to achieve desired reforms. A series of studies have emphasised the agency of recipient states 
in resisting pressure for reform73; the misapplication of pressure by donors74; the 
contradictions within underlying ‘donor support rationale’ structures and African states’ 
ability to manipulate those75; and the limitations of attempts by donors to use aid to achieve 
political reform.76 
 
The second claim, that African growth stems from the rise of fast-growing developing 
economies, draws attention to the latest phase of global uneven development and its impact 
on Africa through stimulating  exports and investment in Africa by ‘rising powers’.77 This 
has certainly affected the strategic calculations and economic opportunities of many African 
states. However, some critical observers argue that a key impact has been to entrench existing 
elites in resource-dependent states, to limit the influence of liberal donors and to limit 
industrialisation efforts (or de-industrialise) African economies. As a result they have 
exacerbated the reliance of African regimes on rents from precisely the sources Cooper 
identified – trade in commodities and financial inflows.78  
 
The effects of growth are also mixed. Past and current ‘growth spurts’ have all led to 
institutional change as state revenue bases change79 and the claimed growth of an ‘African 
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middle class’ and its associated consumption expenditure80 has led to some far-reaching 
claims about wider developmental changes.81 The different interests of new powers add to 
divergent outcomes on the continent.82 On the other hand, the dominant view is that thus far, 
economic growth in Africa has shown little evidence of underlying structural change83. In its 
study of industrial policy in Africa the UNECA noted: ‘Structural transformation in Africa 
has been limited, and in particular has resulted in essentially no productivity growth through 
the expansion of manufacturing’.84  
 
The impact of recent growth in Africa is therefore uneven and differentiated and neither a 
simple case of liberal change, nor of a continued resource dependency and gatekeeping. 
Differences in states’ insertions into the international system, and variation in the policy and 
strategic responses of African elites have led to new and heterogeneous pathways of 
combined development.  
 
National responses to ‘external necessity’ 
As we have seen, U&CD emphasises the agency of later developing countries in responding 
to external threats and opportunities and active importation of technologies and resources. 
The extent to which these have altered developmental strategies, and whether these are 
leading to a decline or otherwise of gatekeeping, is a key question. For many states, 
contemporary changes have resulted in a manoeuvring between the twin impacts of donor 
policy and new sources of revenue. For some states, even small amounts of aid from the likes 
of India, China and Brazil provides more policy ‘space’, an example being Zambia’s attempt 
to resist western pressures to increase privatisation.85 Others such as Ethiopia and Angola 
have been able to avoid the loss of policy autonomy found in more ‘liberalised’ states such as 
Mozambique.86  
 
Other states have sought to import components of development strategy itself, seeking to 
‘learn from abroad’. In her study of policy emulation in east Africa, Elsje Fourie examines 
the ways in which Kenya has sought to learn and adapt lessons from Malaysian and 
Singaporean development and argues against a simple dichotomy of ‘indigenous’ or 
‘externally-imposed’ policy choices.87 Instead, policy elites in Africa seek to emulate and 
adapt strategies and techniques in a process that is not reducible to a monolithic idea of a 
‘Beijing consensus’. Through such ‘learning from abroad’ Kenya seeks to accelerate its 
development trajectory, joining the ranks of East Asian success stories, or as one member of 
the Kenyan policy elite put it ‘give me ten years, I will give you South Korea’.88 Similarly in 
Ethiopia, there are active programmes of overseas training and research into policies that 
might be translated into the Ethiopian context.89 These initiatives embody key processes of 
combined dvelopment, producing new outcomes: ‘Whatever emerges from Kenyan 
emulation of East Asia’ Fourie notes, ‘will surely be a hybrid of actual East Asian 
development trajectories, Kenyan perceptions of those trajectories and material constraints on 
those perceptions’.90 
 
Other national responses to change have focussed on the development of industrial strategy, 
even where gatekeeping practices continue. Tim Kelsall and his colleagues argue that: ‘there 
is no shortage of evidence that neo-patrimonialism, or at least its associated phenomena of 
big-man politics, clientilism, corruption, and rent-seeking, is widespread on the continent’.91 
This accords with other literatures on developmentalism which emphasises the difficulties of 
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establishing effective industrial policy in underdeveloped economies.92 Nevertheless, Kelsall 
et al argue that in some circumstances developmentalism can emerge within or alongside 
neo-patrimonial systems, a key issue being how rent-seeking is organised. In states where 
there is centralised control of rents and long-term rent management, then developmentalism, 
including effective industrial policy, can be achieved despite the continuation of neo-
patrimonialism.93 Notably, given the emphasis of U&CD on the authoritarian tendencies of 
later development, such political features are often accompanied by strong presidential 
leadership, constrained democracy, top-down patron-client relations and confident and 
competent economic technocracies.94  
 
The examples identified by this research are Ethiopia and Rwanda, both of whom combined 
strong leadership, constrained democracy and efficient bureaucracy with long-term plans for 
transformation. In Ethiopia, political repression, curtailment of internal ruling party disputes 
and continuing state control of significant aspects of the economy were accompanied by 
efforts to insulate agencies overseeing industrial policy from political interference, and 
improvements in the civil service involving the use of merit- and results-based principles for 
appointments and advancement.95 Yet despite continuing ‘gatekeeper’ practices such as 
personal patronage and clientilism, the state has not shown the kind of rampant personal 
enrichment of elites found elsewhere.96 According to Alemu and Scoones97 Ethiopia shows 
considerable bureaucratic capacity and use of its geostrategic positioning and south-south 
alliances to negotiate with external actors. It has been ‘highly successful in mobilising, 
channelling and focussing external aid and investment towards developmental ends’ avoiding 
the worst of the political distortion and corruption seen in some other countries’.98 Echoing 
the emphasis of U&CD on the tendencies towards authoritarianism, Kelsall et al argue that ‘it 
is unclear whether a more liberal regime could even survive, let alone preside over levels of 
social and economic progress which Ethiopia is apparently witnessing.’.99 ‘In current African 
conditions’ they go on, ‘highly competitive multiparty democracy tends to amplify clientilist 
demands, and make long-horizon rent centralization practically impossible’. 100 
 
In Rwanda’s case, a combination of limited electoral competition and a close relationship 
between the ruling party and its wholly owned Tri-Star/CVL holding company has been key. 
The latter supplies the party with its own source of income, relieving officials of the need for 
corrupt practices to finance elections and allowing it to be tough on internal discipline.101 For 
both Rwanda and Ethiopia, they conclude, ‘there is little evidence to date to suggest that 
industrial policy initiatives have fallen prey to the kinds of unproductive rent-seeking the 
conventional wisdom associates with neo-patrimonial states’.102 It’s also worth noting that 
both Ethiopia and Rwanda are examples of ‘liberation states’ – that is states formed out of the 
military overthrow of previous African regimes. Such states, as Dorman notes, enjoy (at least 
in the early phase of their rule) a level of autonomy from societal actors, dominance over 
society and secure hegemony meaning that access to spoils is both centralised and 
controlled.103 
 
Heterogeneity and combined development 
As we have seen, U&CD suggests that because of multiple process of combination and 
differing national developmental histories, heterogeneity should be an expected outcome of 
development even within a particular geographic region. The ways in which politics is 
organised in different states and the extent to which some states are demonstrating 
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developmental practices that diverge from the gatekeeper characterisation – or in the case of 
South Africa states that seem to be adopting more gatekeeping practices104 – also therefore 
differs greatly across the continent. Add to this the existence or not of conflict or 
democratisation and the picture of contemporary African statehood becomes even more 
varied. Even among those seen as in some senses ‘developmental’ – Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Rwanda – there are important differences both in the ways in which politics is organised 
internally as well as the preceding history of capitalist development in each country.  
 
There is even divergence among states that arguably still lie more fully within the 
‘gatekeeping’ mould. Some have continued to rely on well-established sources of rents (oil in 
Nigeria or Angola, diamonds in Botswana). Others have been forced to adapt their 
gatekeeping strategies, an example being Eritrea where declining export earnings, aid and 
foreign investment, has prompted the state to find new sources of revenue. Here, a key 
strategy has been to extract rents from the growing Eritrean diaspora as war, economic crisis 
and state repression prompts new waves of legal and illegal emigration.105 Yet, as Poole 
notes, ‘rather than being dismantled by the flight of its citizens, [the state] has been sustained 
via new strategies of gatekeeping’.106 As a result, remittances make up a large proportion of 
Eritrea’s GDP and have become the focus of state gatekeeping activity including directly tax 
the incomes of Eritreans abroad, enforced through various threats to emigrants’ families.107 
Thus while the nature of the interface between the internal and external is changing, control 
of the gate remains key. However, somewhat in contrast to Cooper’s portrayal of gatekeeper 
states as internally weak, the Eritrean state exercises quite far-reaching control of its 
citizens.108  
 
The multiple impacts of new international drivers of development, the different ways in 
which different African states have reacted to those drivers, and the legacies of previous 
histories of development, have produced diverse combinations within Africa. These include 
modern bureaucracies (or modern components within bureaucracies), sometimes encouraged 
by donor governance reforms, combining with dominant parties or ‘big man’ politics; 
multiparty systems existing alongside authoritarianism and clientilism; East Asian-inspired 
industrial policy alongside continued gatekeeping practices; and ‘islands’ of export-
production and manufacturing amid un- or semi-transformed rural sectors. While an 
understanding of the changing practices of gatekeeping, and its erosion or consolidation is an 
important part of the picture, U&CD allows us to situate that within a broader understanding 
of the international dynamics and heterogeneous products of developmental processes. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Cooper’s idea of the gatekeeper state is engaging precisely because it directs our attention at 
the intersection of the national and international and demands that we understand those 
evolving linkages and how they shape the formation and direction of statehood, politics and 
development. Cooper’s conception of gatekeeper states exhibits some strong synergies with 
developmental processes and outcomes highlighted by the theory of U&CD. However, while 
Cooper’s account empirically acknowledges variation within Africa, the gatekeeper concept 
as it has been developed thus far is less adept at identifying heterogeneity in statehood either 
in the years after independence or in the contemporary period. To do this requires a greater 
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specification of state forms and actions than is currently given in literature on gatekeeper 
states, though some of that is emerging. The need to account for heterogeneity is particularly 
marked in looking at contemporary changes within Africa where there is some evidence that 
even while aspects of gatekeeping remain firmly in place (clientilism, rent seeking and neo-
patrimonialism) there is also evidence of longer-term developmental endeavour. These 
include new efforts to import components of development from outside (such as the 
emulation of Asian developmental successes) and their combination with existing national 
conditions, as well as interventionism and authoritarianism. Over and above the much-
commented on and varied growth performance of African economies, therefore, these 
processes may lead to renewed heterogeneity among African states.  
 
The policy implications of all this for donors are important. First, it brings into question the 
claim that recent African growth owes much to the ‘one size fits all’ liberalising reforms of 
economic policy and governance promoted by donors, a point made in more recent work by 
Cooper himself.109 In fact the African states showing clearest evidence of sustained 
developmentalism diverge from the path advised by donors in significant ways. Second, it 
presents donors who promote both economic and political liberalisation with the quandary 
that success in one field (economic growth and structural transformation) may come with 
limits on the other (continued authoritarianism). Finally, while donors navigate those two 
issues they will also have to develop more sophisticated country knowledge and greater 
nuance in dealing with the African actors – states, elites, businesspeople, citizens – they are 
hoping to influence.110   
 
Finally, this paper has utilised propositions drawn from U&CD to frame the investigation of 
developmental change in Africa. The theory is useful in this because it draws our attention to 
aspects of development such as combination and hybridity, policy emulation, interventionism 
and heterogeneity in a way that integrates them into a generalised understanding of the inter-
relations between development and international relations. It therefore offers a potential 
theoretical grounding for a number of key elements of Cooper’s account of African politics 
and development whilst also providing a means to situate this within a broader account of the 
global unevenness that frames Africa’s development now and in the past.   
 
Central to this, and something Cooper would presumably have some sympathy with – is the 
emphasis on the combination of internal social change with external relations, that is, the role 
of ‘the international’ in social development. Rather than bringing this in as a contingent 
factor (as is arguably the case with the gatekeeper state concept) U&CD sees as internal to 
any explanation of state formation and development these myriad multilinear, interactive and 
above all international processes. By its emphasis on the combined production of  
heterogeneity across the international system, U&CD also helps us to see beyond ‘thinking of 
Africa as peculiar and other places as normal’ as Cooper put it.111 From the perspective of 
U&CD, to some extent, everywhere is peculiar and heterogeneity is normal.  
 
It also enables us to attend to Cooper’s on-going concern to emphasise the co-production and 
co-responsibility of those inside and outside the continent in addressing and shaping Africa’s 
developmental future. ‘The patterns we often see’ Cooper wrote, ‘do not necessarily have the 
solidity we think they possess. They were born of contingent and contested political 
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processes…’. We need to remember, he went on, that ‘the possibilities for the future…are 
multiple’.112 
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